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Discretionary Reform
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AS THE ONLY
EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM IN TODAY’S
POLARIZED CONGRESS
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutorial discretion is the authority vested in certain
officers to select whom to charge and prosecute.1 In response to a
limitation on resources and overbearing caseloads, the
government has authorized enforcement officers to refrain from
using the full scope of their enforcement power.2 As a result,
enforcement discretion has been exercised upon certain
individuals who may have redeeming qualities despite having
violated a law.3
Although there is no statutory authority for prosecutorial
discretion in the immigration law context, a series of agency
statements have recognized its use.4 Most recently, on June 15,
2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano published
a memorandum setting forth standards for exercising prosecutorial
discretion for young immigrants who unintentionally violated
immigration laws when they were brought to the U.S. as minors.5
Pursuant to this memorandum, the Department of Homeland
Security, through the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), began accepting applications for Consideration
of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) on August 15,
2012.6 Secretary Napolitano’s use of prosecutorial discretion in
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009).
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT’L L.J. 243, 244-45 (2010).
3 Id. at 244.
4 Id.
5 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children, 1 (June 15, 2012), [hereinafter Napolitano Memo], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-whocame-to-us-as-children.pdf.
6 News Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS Begins
Accepting Requests for Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (Aug. 15,
2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-begins-accepting-requests-considerationdeferred-action-childhood-arrivals.
1
2
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DACA is a natural outgrowth of the steady increase in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion within immigration agencies
since 2000.7
The approval of prosecutorial discretion was a necessary
response to Congress’s failure to address the complex issues posed
by the growing rate of illegal immigration in the United States,
including the continued separation of loved ones from U.S. citizen
family members,8 the mandatory detention and deportation of
criminal aliens,9 and the validity of deporting productive young
immigrants who have contributed to American society.10 Congress
has, thus far, failed to enact reform of any kind, such as in the
refusal to pass the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors (DREAM) Act in December 2010, versions of which have
sought passage since 2001.11 Legislative gridlock has prevented
Congress from responding to this problem.12
Humanitarian interests should naturally be a part of the
American discussion on immigration reform given the tragic
circumstances that inform, and arguably compel, many
immigrants’ decision to come to the United States, with or
without lawful status.13 For example, asylum and refugee laws
are an illustration of a deep-rooted belief in humanitarian aid in
the immigration system.14 In addition, policies with regard to
7 See generally Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization Service, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, 3
(Nov. 17, 2000), [hereinafter Meissner Memo], available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/22092970/INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00.
8 Cindy Huang, Family Separated by Immigration Woes, Waiting for Reform,
PBS NEWSHOUR (June 27, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/06/
family-separated-by-immigration-bill-waiting-for-reform.html.
9 US: Mandatory Deportation Laws Harm American Families, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 18, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/17/us-mandatory-deportationlaws-harm-american-families.
10 See generally Katie Annand, Still Waiting for the Dream: The Injustice of
Punishing Undocumented Immigrant Students, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (2008).
11 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act, S. 1291,
107th Cong. (2001); Naftali Bendavid, Dream Act Fails in Senate, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704368004576027570843930428.html;
Carl
Hulse, Senate Democrats put ‘Dream Act’ on Hold, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/senate-democrats-put-dream-act-on-hold/.
12 This is true in other areas of law as well; much of the dysfunction of our
current immigration system is due to the inability of the leaders of this nation to come
to terms with their political inconsistencies and differences. See Wadhia, supra note 2, at
298; see also A Congress Too Polarized to Protect Itself, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-25/a-congress-too-polarized-to-protect-itself.html;
see also How Washington’s Dysfunction Harms Economic Growth BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 7,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-07/how-washington-s-dysfunction-harmseconomic-growth.html.
13 See generally John J. Ammann, No Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform:
The Incomplete Compassion of U.S. Immigration Policy, 79 UMKC L. REV. 853, 854 (2011).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012).
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victims of domestic violence,15 crimes,16 or human trafficking17
reinforce this concept. Many of these humanitarian reforms grant
temporary relief but fail to provide immigrants with much-needed
stability; very few of them provide permanent residence or a
pathway to citizenship.18 Even these humanitarian policies have a
narrow scope and do not address the growing problem of illegal
immigration to the United States.
Furthermore, the laws in place to prevent the growth of
illegal immigration raise serious concerns for the undocumented
immigrant population. The passage of both the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigrant Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996 refocused the discourse
on immigration reform to strengthen border enforcement
procedures19 and enacted mass mandatory detention and
deportation of documented and undocumented immigrants
with criminal convictions.20 As a result, “[j]ust about any
offense . . . could render the alien deportable.”21 Therefore, the
humanitarian-based compassion that had been exercised
toward certain groups of immigrants22 has not been applied to
the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the
nation today.23
Today’s comprehensive immigration reform debate
frequently ignores the real, human, and often very young, lives
that are affected by these laws.24 On the other hand, authorities
15 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2000).
16 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464-1491 (2000).
17 Id. at 1491-1548 (2000).
18 Getting a U or T visa, being granted asylum, or adjusting status under
VAWA is very difficult. See generally Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum
Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1
(1993); Greta D. Stoltz, Comment, The U Visa: Another Remedy for Battered Immigrant
Women, 7 SCHOLAR 127 (2004).
19 See generally Ellen G. Yost, Immigration and Nationality Law, 31 INT’L
LAW. 589, 590 (1997).
20 See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936,
1936-38 (2000).
21 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 28-29 (7th ed. 2012).
22 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
23 MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN
THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.
24 Mary Ann Walsh, A Plea for Common Sense and Compassion in the
Immigration Debate, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
on-faith/wp/2013/08/08/finding-common-sense-and-compassion-in-the-immigration-debate/.
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have used prosecutorial discretion in the immigration law context
to address humanitarian concerns for certain immigrant groups.25
The direction the Obama administration has taken with respect
to prosecutorial discretion reflects some of the more humanitarian
values that should play a role in enforcing our immigration laws.
Ultimately, the most meaningful chance of reform for certain
immigrant populations may be through prosecutorial discretion.26
This note argues for the increased use of prosecutorial
discretion as a temporary and humanitarian measure to
address immigration reform in lieu of failed legislation. Part I
of this note provides a short historical discussion of the
development of prosecutorial discretion within the Department
of Homeland Security. It also gives a brief overview of the DACA
program as an exemplary form of prosecutorial discretion. Part
II compares DACA with Temporary Protected Status, and with
the amnesty provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act to elucidate the differences between congressionally
enacted immigration reform and temporary reform via
prosecutorial discretion, arguing in favor of the latter. Part III of
this note discusses the comprehensive immigration reform bill
that the Senate recently passed to showcase the tensions
Congress continues to experience with immigration. Part IV
points to the evolution of prosecutorial discretion as an
economically efficient, fair, and humanitarian resource,
advocating that it be maintained as a useful tool within the
discourse on immigration reform. Finally, this note concludes by
suggesting that a comprehensive exercise of prosecutorial
discretion may be, as a temporary measure, more effective in
reforming immigration laws in today’s volatile political landscape.
I.

THE HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

In both administrative and criminal law, prosecutorial
discretion is a concept that accepts the authority of an agency
to exercise judgment in determining against whom and when to
prosecute certain cases. This discretion is partly based on the
agency’s priorities and resources, and on the underlying purpose
of the immigration laws.27 Prosecutorial discretion is also an
See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
For a compelling analysis of advocacy through prosecutorial discretion for
young undocumented immigrants, see M. Aryah Somers, Zealous Advocacy for the
Right to Be Heard for Children and Youth in Deportation Proceedings, 15 CUNY L.
REV. 189 (2011).
27 Wadhia, supra note 2, at 244.
25
26

2014] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION & IMMIGRATION REFORM

905

exercise in deciding when not to prosecute, which reflects the
balance the agency must espouse in deciding who should avail
themselves of the immigration laws.28 This authority has been
confirmed and accepted by the Supreme Court, which held that
“[t]he agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with
the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its
priorities,”29 and that “courts generally will defer to an agency’s
construction of the statute it is charged with implementing, and
to the procedures it adopts for implementing that statute.”30
Top officials from the Department of Homeland Security,
and formerly the Department of Justice, have recognized and
accepted prosecutorial discretion as part of the nation’s
immigration laws.31 The first significant public mention of
prosecutorial discretion came in the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) Operations Instructions in 1975.32
The Operation Instructions revealed specific criteria that
immigration officers were to consider in adjudicating what
were aptly called “nonpriority” cases.33 Lurking behind this
murky phrase, prosecutorial discretion became a mysterious
form of relief in immigration law for many years. In an
examination of this program, known as “deferred action,”34
Professor Leon Wildes, did several studies35 of the number of
cases that were granted and the specific criteria used for these
affirmations.36 Data from the study showed that USCIS
repeatedly used seven factors in determining whether to defer
action in deportation proceedings.37 Particularly, USCIS
granted deferred action in cases involving: (1) separation of
family or hardship, (2) the medically infirm, (3) the young, (4)
the mentally incompetent, (5) potential negative publicity, (6)
Id. at 255.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985); see also Chevron USA v.
Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
30 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
31 See generally Wadhia, supra note 2, at 244.
32 See generally Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration
Service: Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99 (1979).
33 Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41
S.D. L. REV. 819, 820 (2004).
34 Deferred action means to literally defer action on deportation so that
beneficiaries of deferred action have their deportations halted but receive no actual
legal immigration status.
35 See generally Wildes, supra note 32; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority
Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use
of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976).
36 Wildes, supra note 33, at 824, 830-32.
37 Id. at 830-31, Table 3 & Table 4.
28
29
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victims of domestic violence, and (7) the elderly.38 Wildes
concluded that the variety of factors used elucidated the
structured approach the agency took in implementing deferred
action, though applied mostly in unofficial secrecy.39
In a more recent study on deferred action, Professor
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia detailed the difficulties she
experienced in making numerous Freedom of Information Act
requests to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
and USCIS regarding the current state of the deferred action
program.40 Professor Wadhia’s 19-month quest revealed that an
overwhelmingly low number of deferred action cases had been
granted. “These numbers suggest that the real concern lies in
the fact that many non-citizens who meet the common criteria
utilized by the agency in assessing deferred action lack access
or knowledge about deferred action . . . .”41 Professor Wadhia
concluded that this was a result of the lack of transparency in
the program.42
The criteria from the Operation Instructions of 1975
were reaffirmed and publicized in a memorandum by former
Commissioner of INS, Doris Meissner, on November 17, 2000.43
The Meissner memo identifies a range of possible actions
undertaken by immigration enforcement officers that fall within
the ambit of prosecutorial discretion. In particular, the memo
suggests that prosecutorial discretion can be exercised in a
proactive manner by granting affirmative immigration relief to
the extent applicable, such as in the form of deferred action.44
This is not to say that prosecutorial discretion can be
used to grant one legal permanent residence or citizenship45—
which can only be conferred through statutory authority—but
rather, that exercising discretion in deciding not to enforce
removal may inadvertently grant some temporary immigration
benefits.46 Emphasizing the finite resources of the INS, the memo
Id.
See generally Wildes, supra note 33.
40 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action
and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U. N. H. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012).
41 Id. at 47.
42 See generally id.
43 Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 1.
44 Id. at 2.
45 Id. at 3.
46 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 517-18 (2009) (“[T]he Executive still has de facto delegated
authority to grant relief from removal on a case-by-case basis. The Executive simply
exercises this authority through its prosecutorial discretion, rather than by evaluating
eligibility pursuant to a statutory framework at the end of removal proceedings.”)
38
39
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set forth particular standards for immigration officials to consider
when deciding whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion, such
as length of residence in the United States, humanitarian
concerns, lack of resources, and criminal history.47
Despite a significant reorganization of the immigration
system following the September 11, 2001 attacks,48 the Meissner
memo’s endorsement of prosecutorial discretion survived and was
supplemented by additional policy statements. The most
significant were a series of memoranda published in March and
June of 2011 by ICE Director John Morton.49 Morton
reemphasized the necessity of prosecutorial discretion to
immigration enforcement and cited several discretionary factors
in determining its use.50 Acknowledging the historical practice
of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context,51 the
June memo emphasized the limited resources of ICE’s
enforcement powers and stressed that removal operations were
to focus on the “agency’s enforcement priorities, namely the
promotion of national security, border security, public safety,
and the integrity of the immigration system.”52
Both the Meissner and Morton memos strongly considered
humanitarian concerns. The Meissner memo, for example,
explicitly identified humanitarian concerns as a factor in deciding
whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion. These humanitarian
Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 7-8.
David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act
Reorganization: An Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, INSIGHT: MIGRATION
POL’Y INST., Apr. 2003, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/
insight_4-2003.pdf.
49 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was restructured and
re-named the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE, which fell under
the Department of Justice, was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security
on March 1, 2003 as part of the Homeland Security Act. For more detailed analysis on
this reorganization see id.
50 Memorandum from John Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, on Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens, 2 (Mar. 2, 2011), [hereinafter Morton, Civil
Immigration Enforcement], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/
2011/110302washingtondc.pdf; Memorandum from John Morton, Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
Consistent with the Civil Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension,
Detention and Removal of Aliens, 2 (June 17, 2011), [hereinafter Morton, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/
pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
51 Morton refers to numerous agency memoranda discussing prosecutorial
discretion including a 1976 memo from INS General Counsel Sam Bernsen, the
aforementioned Meissner Memo, memoranda from William J. Howard, Principal Legal
Advisor, and Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary of ICE, among others. See Morton,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 50, at 1.
52 Id. at 2.
47
48
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concerns included medical conditions, family ties in the United
States and, most notably, whether “an alien entered the United
States at a very young age” and “whether the alien speaks the
language or has relatives in the home country.”53 Similarly, the
June Morton memo noted that “certain classes of individuals”
warranted particular care in the favorable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.54 Such classes included “individuals
present in the United States since childhood,” minors, the
elderly, veterans, pregnant women, and more.55
These factors, coupled with the enforcement priorities
delineated in the March memo, evince the clear weight that
humanitarian concerns have in determining the appropriate
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. ICE’s enforcement priorities
were divided into three classifications with an emphasis on
criminal aliens: Priority 1 for the detention of aliens who pose a
danger to national security or a risk to public safety; Priority 2
for recent illegal entrants; Priority 3 for aliens who are fugitives
or otherwise obstruct immigration controls. This emphasis on
aliens with criminal convictions highlighted the important
option of prosecutorial discretion “when dealing with lawful
permanent residents, juveniles, and the immediate family
members of U.S. citizens.”56
Even the White House has turned to prosecutorial
discretion as a means of addressing some of the humanitarian
concerns posed by current immigration policies. In response to
Congress’ refusal to pass the DREAM Act in December 2010,57
President Barack Obama announced on June 15, 2012, that the
Department of Homeland Security would begin granting
temporary relief from deportation to certain young, undocumented
immigrants.58 Given the aforementioned agency statements
regarding the use of prosecutorial discretion and President
Obama’s deferred action announcement,59 Secretary Napolitano
provided guidelines for extending prosecutorial discretion to certain
undocumented young immigrants in her memorandum of June

Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 7.
Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 50, at 5.
55 Id. at 5.
56 See Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50, at 1-4.
57 See supra note 11.
58 News Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Remarks by
the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter June 15, 2012 News
Release], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarkspresident-immigration.
59 Id.
53
54
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15, 2012, under what is now known as the DACA, or Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals, program.
Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum, like that of its
predecessors, considered humanitarian concerns in deciding
when to exercise prosecutorial discretion.60 Secretary
Napolitano explained that the policies of general enforcement
of immigration laws “are not designed to be blindly enforced
without consideration given to the individual circumstances of
each case. Nor . . . to remove productive young people [who]
have already contributed to our country in significant ways.
Prosecutorial discretion, which is used in so many other areas,
is especially justified here.”61
Secretary Napolitano set forth specific criteria that every
applicant must meet and which were delineated by USCIS
following the memorandum’s publication. In particular, the
applicant must be: under the age of 31; have entered the United
States before the age of 16; have continuously resided in the
United States since June 15, 2007; have been physically present
in the United States on June 15, 2012; be in school, have
graduated from high school, or be an honorably discharged
veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces; and have not been
convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more
other misdemeanors.62
Secretary Napolitano ended the memorandum
emphasizing that “no substantive right, immigration status or
pathway to citizenship” would derive from this deferred
action.63 “Only the Congress, acting through its legislative
authority, can confer these rights,” the memo noted.64 “It
remains for the executive branch, however, to set forth policy
for the exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing
law.”65 The DACA application, if successfully pursued and
approved, grants young immigrants a two-year employment
authorization, which may be renewed.66
As it stands today, DACA is merely an extension of the
prosecutorial discretion that was precisely described in the
See generally Napolitano Memo, supra note 5.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 1.
63 Id. at 3.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Consideration of Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 18,
2013), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsprocess/frequently-asked-questions.
60
61
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Meissner and Morton memos, with some of the same language
echoed throughout the new application. DACA gives applicants
temporary relief from deportation while conferring some stability
in the form of employment authorization.67 Agency statements on
prosecutorial discretion have emphasized the importance of
focusing enforcement power on the agency’s priorities, such as the
immediate detention of aliens who pose a threat to national
security and public safety.68 Prosecutorial discretion exists as a
means to ensure fair results for exactly the kind of immigrants
that DACA addresses. DACA is a prime example of the
appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion, and may highlight the
type of immigration policies that should prevail.
II.

FAILED ATTEMPTS AT IMMIGRATION REFORM

Although it does not confer permanent immigration
status, prosecutorial discretion has been a more effective
mechanism for temporary immigration reform than current
enacted legislation. To demonstrate this, this section compares
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in DACA with the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and the Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) provision of the Immigration Act of 1990,
two congressionally enacted immigration policies that failed to
meet their goals. By comparing DACA to IRCA and TPS, this
section seeks to demonstrate that prosecutorial discretion,
although it does not confer permanent immigration status, is a
more effective mechanism for temporary immigration reform.
A.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198669
made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire undocumented
immigrants, and imposed a penalty on those who did not verify
their employees’ immigration status within three days of their
hires.70 In addition, IRCA provided amnesty to certain groups
of undocumented immigrants who could prove their continuous
67 These are all similar factors that were emphasized for discretionary relief
in the Morton memo. See Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50, at 2.
68 See generally Meissner Memo, supra note 7; Memorandum from Julie L.
Myers, Assistant Sec. of Immigr. and Customs Enforcement, on Prosecutorial and
Custody Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007), [hereinafter Myers Memo], available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092973/ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-JulieMyers-11-7-07; Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50.
69 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
70 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii).
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presence in the United States since January 1, 1982,71 as well
as to certain farm workers under the Special Agricultural
Worker program.72 The goals of IRCA were to deter illegal
immigration and protect American workers from wage
competition with undocumented immigrants.73 The penalty
imposed on employers who hired undocumented immigrants
was balanced by an amnesty to the millions of undocumented
immigrants already in the country.74 According to a study by the
Migration Policy Institute, the amnesty granted legal status to
approximately three million undocumented immigrants.75 This did
not result in a decrease in illegal immigration, however.76 Instead,
illegal immigration and employment discrimination increased in
the years following IRCA, defeating the statute’s initial goals.77
Indeed, many opponents of comprehensive immigration reform
have used IRCA’s failure to decrease illegal immigration to argue
against DACA as yet another form of amnesty to another large
sector of the undocumented population.78
But unlike IRCA, DACA seeks to prioritize immigration
enforcement resources by granting a group of young, educated
and productive members of American society temporary reprieve
from deportation.79 DACA’s purpose is not to curb illegal
immigration, but rather to give an affirmative structure to the
already-utilized mechanism of prosecutorial discretion in granting
deferral to certain immigrants whom the executive branch
thought to be both worthy of reprieve and crucial to the
productivity and cultural fabric of American society.80 IRCA’s
8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (2012).
73 Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants:
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 201 (2007).
74 Christopher Angevine, Amnesty and the “Legality” of Illegal Immigration:
How Reliance and Underenforcement Inform the Immigration Debate, 50 S. TEX. L.
REV. 235, 240 (2008).
75 Betsy Cooper & Kevin O’Neil, Lessons from the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Policy Brief No. 3, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., Aug. 2005, available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05.pdf; see also Wishnie,
supra note 73, at 205-06.
76 Id.
77 Richard A. Johnson, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent Need for an
Updated Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the
United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 251-52 (2007).
78 A Reagan Legacy: Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July
4, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128303672.
79 Napolitano Memo, supra note 5, at 3.
80 See June 15, 2012 News Release supra note 58 (“These are young people
who study in our schools, they play in our neighborhoods, they’re friends with our kids,
they pledge allegiance to our flag. . . . [I]t makes no sense to expel talented young
people. . . who want to staff our labs, or start new businesses, or defend our country. . .
71
72
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amnesty provision, on the other hand, was primarily meant to
balance strict new sanctions for employers who propagated the
influx of undocumented immigrants, in the hopes of directly
curtailing illegal immigration.81 In addition, IRCA’s amnesty
provision provided a vehicle for undocumented immigrants to
adjust status and receive legal permanent residence, and
eventually, citizenship.82 DACA does not and cannot provide
amnesty. Indeed, the President does not have the power to
confer such a status adjustment unilaterally.83
The comparisons between IRCA and DACA stem from
the significant immigration relief that DACA confers on its
applicants. But DACA is considerably different than the IRCA
amnesty. DACA can be more aptly described as a humanitarian
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.84 It aims to maintain the
benefits of having particular members of society remain in the
United States, and elicits a closer examination of the types of
deportations that should be implemented. DACA acknowledges
the existence of a class of undocumented immigrants that are not
only productive members of American society, but have their lives
ingrained in American culture, and often do not remember their
home country nor have any family there. For these young
immigrants, the United States is their home country. DACA is
not a permanent solution, but it is a step toward a more
humanitarian, efficient, and fair immigration policy. IRCA, on the
other hand, was another failed attempt by Congress to please
ideologically opposed factions in the immigration reform debate.

these young people are going to make extraordinary contributions, and are already
making contributions to our society.”).
81 Wishnie, supra note 73, at 205-06.
82 Id. at 194-95 n.8.
83 Congress has delineated the procedures for granting immigration status in
the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012); Meissner Memo,
supra note 7, at 3. These procedures cannot be circumvented by the president and the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not confer these benefits. See U.S. Const. art.
II, § 3 (requiring the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” even
when he politically disagrees with Congress).
84 The language in DACA can be traced back to the language used in both the
Meissner and Morton Memos. The emphasis on prioritizing deportations of criminal
aliens while focusing on humanitarian factors such as young age, length of residency in
the United States amongst others in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion makes
DACA consistent with the policies of immigration enforcement expounded since 2000.
Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 7; Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra
note 50, at 5.
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Temporary Protected Status (TPS)

DACA grants temporary status and employment
authorization to a specified group of undocumented immigrants.85
Likewise, the Immigration Act of 1990’s Temporary Protected
Status provision granted power to the Attorney General to
provide temporary status to immigrants who were unable to
return to their country due to ongoing armed conflict,
environmental disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances.86
TPS is codified under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, and its benefits defined
as the authorization for “the alien to engage in employment in
the United States and provide the alien with an ‘employment
authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit.”87
TPS arose from a campaign to grant temporary refuge
to Salvadorans who fled the civil conflict in that country.88
Focusing on the humanitarian and political concerns of the
Salvadoran war, Congress chose to extend protection to those who
fled, granting them a temporary reprieve from deportation and
legal employment status.89 As the Immigration Act of 1990
conference report explained, the TPS legislation was meant to
ensure refuge for Salvadorans who faced civil conflict in their
home country. The United States’ heavy involvement in the
Salvadoran conflict carried “responsibilities [of] humanitarian
concern toward the Salvadorans . . . .”90 Former Democratic
85
86

Napolitano Memo, supra note 5, at 2.
The original text of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b) reads:

(1) In general The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate
agencies of the Government, may designate any foreign state (or any part of
such foreign state) under this subsection only if— (A) the Attorney General finds
that there is an ongoing armed conflict within the state and, due to such conflict,
requiring the return of aliens who are nationals of that state to that state (or to
the part of the state) would pose a serious threat to their personal safety; (B) the
Attorney General finds that— (i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought,
epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial,
but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected, (ii) the foreign
state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state of aliens
who are nationals of the state, and (iii) the foreign state officially has requested
designation under this subparagraph; or (C) the Attorney General finds that there
exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent
aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety, unless
the Attorney General finds that permitting the aliens to remain temporarily in
the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1254a (b)(1)(2012).
87 Id. § 1254a (a)(1)(B).
88 Eva Segerblom, Temporary Protected Status: An Immigration Statute That
Redefines Traditional Notions of Status and Temporariness, 7 NEV. L. J. 664, 665 (2007).
89 Id.
90 136 Cong. Rec. S17106-01 (1990) (Statement of Sen. Dennis Deconcini).
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Senator for Arizona Dennis Deconini added, “I do not believe that
we should return these individuals to a country immersed in a
civil war in which we are actively involved.”91 This temporary
status was granted at the discretion of the Attorney General as
“essentially an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”92
Many problems have emerged, however, from the first
grant of state TPS designation to El Salvador in 1990, to the
most recent, Syria in 2012. The humanitarian and political
purposes behind the statute were dwarfed by the rise of gross
unfairness and limited reprieve to TPS recipients.93 Although
congressionally enacted, TPS does not confer tangible
immigration benefits to its recipients. This means that anyone
who finds himself out of TPS may face deportation, and anyone
with TPS is unable to ever obtain permanent residence or
citizenship, or give TPS to immediate family.94 As it stands today,
TPS grants nationals of a designated foreign state only temporary
work authorization if they meet certain statutory requirements:
continuous physical presence from the time of state designation,
admissibility as an immigrant pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182,95 and
timely registration during the registration period.96 Furthermore,
as a function of being employed in the United States, these
immigrants must pay federal and state taxes,97 but are barred
from receiving Social Security benefits, which they pay into for
many years as their state designation is renewed.98
When a nation continues to suffer from internal conflict
or environmental disaster, and is time and again re-designated
under TPS, the beneficiaries of TPS from that nation are left in
an 18-month limbo.99 The 18-month period may be renewed if the
country is re-designated under TPS, but it could also be
terminated. Although eligible to work legally in the United
States, TPS recipients suffer from gross inequalities and no
Id.
Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards A New Regional and
Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 548 n.19 (1998).
93 Segerblom, supra note 88, at 671.
94 Id.
95 There are several specified health, criminal, and other grounds of
inadmissibility for aliens seeking admission as defined under this section of the
statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012); see generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Temporary Protected Status Eligibility Requirements (last updated June 18,
2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/tps.
96 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c) (2012).
97 See Segerblom, supra note 88, at 671.
98 Id.
99 Temporary Protected Status state designation is re-evaluated every 18
months. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (b)(3) (2012); Temporary Protected Status Eligibility
Requirements, supra note 95.
91
92
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pathways to permanently remain in the nation they have worked
and fostered a life in. When designation is terminated, frequently
without sensible consideration as to the current condition of the
designated nation, hundreds of former-TPS recipients face
deportation, often to a country they no longer recognize.100 As
described in relation to the termination of TPS for Montserrat,101
“292 nationals of Montserrat were thrown out of a country they
had lived in for eight years . . . [T]axes and Social
Security . . . paid are of no benefit to them now as they are forced
out of the country. [I]f a national of Montserrat TPS recipient is
found . . . he will be placed in removal proceedings.”102
A 2011 study by the Congressional Research Service
found that there are approximately 217,000 Salvadorans,
48,000 Haitians, and 66,000 Hondurans currently living in the
United States under TPS.103 If terminated, deportation
proceedings would commence for 331,000 individuals. The harsh
consequences of termination of TPS designation create pockets of
American immigrant society that are living with a constant fear
that their immigrant-status will be revoked—a circular kind of
immigration reform that is inefficient and cold.
The similarities between TPS and DACA are undeniable.
Both forms of relief arose from political, humanitarian, or
economic factors. Both applications grant a temporary reprieve
from deportation, while conferring employment eligibility on its
recipients.104 In addition, both TPS and DACA focus on
particular sectors of the immigrant population, and do not act
as a comprehensive amnesty provision.105 And both applications
are granted under strictly discretionary terms, with several
limiting factors.
Segerblom, supra note 88, at 674-75.
Montserrat TPS was initially designated in 1997 as a result of an active
volcano which forced evacuations of more than half the island and destroyed most of its
infrastructure. Id. at 674.
102 Id.
103 Ruth Ellen Wassem & Karma Ester, Temporary Protected Status: Current
Immigration Policy and Issues, Congressional Research Service (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/179582.pdf.
104 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 66; see also Temporary Protected Status Eligibility Requirements, supra note 95.
105 TPS affected only aliens who were present in the United States at the time
their country was designated for protection. Any other national of these designated
countries who fled after designation was ineligible for TPS. DACA would similarly
affect young undocumented immigrants who are present in the United States at the
time of designation, but also aliens under the age of 30, among other specific criteria
that limits its impact. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 66; see also Temporary Protected Status Eligibility Requirements,
supra note 95.
100
101
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Unlike TPS however, DACA confers more than just
employment authorization and tax-paying obligations. DACA
recipients are potentially eligible for state benefits such as
driver’s licenses and in-state college tuition.106 In addition,
DACA is said to affect a larger population than TPS ever did,
bringing a significant percentage of young, productive, but
undocumented, members of American society out of the
shadows.107 Most significantly though, DACA is a leap in
American immigration reform because it breaches the barriers
of congressional stalemates by proactively developing new ways
to fix the immigration system. Although DACA may result in
injustices similar to those created by termination of a TPS
designation, DACA’s strength lies in the fact that it is not
solely a humanitarian policy (as TPS was) but rather a
progressive recognition that not all undocumented immigrants
should be turned away.108
Between August 2012 and August 2013, USCIS
accepted 567,563 applications for DACA, of which 455,455 were
approved.109 A study conducted by the Immigration Policy
Center has found that 61% of DACA recipients have obtained a
new job and 54% opened their first bank account.110 Also, in the
study, “Ninety-four percent of survey respondents indicated that
they would apply for citizenship if ever eligible. This finding
106 These benefits will vary by state and have already been blocked by several
states such as Arizona, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. This note does not seek to
discuss state-specific DACA benefits but rather to elucidate the potential for greater
reform through DACA in contrasting it with TPS. See David Adams & Alex
Dobuzinskis, Battle Far From Over for US Immigrants Who Get Deferrals, REUTERS,
Aug. 18, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/18/us-usaimmigration-dreamers-idUSBRE87H01A20120818.
107 Jeffrey Passel and Mark Hugo Lopez, Up to 1.7 Million Unauthorized
Immigrant Youth May Benefit from New Deportation Rules, PEW HISPANIC CTR. (Aug. 14,
2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/08/14/up-to-1-7-million-unauthorized-immigrantyouth-may-benefit-from-new-deportation-rules/; see supra note 100 and accompanying
text (detailing current numbers of TPS recipients).
108 Prosecutorial discretion focuses on the economic efficiency and viability of
enforcement priorities. Although DACA is certainly an economics-based exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, it is also undeniably humanitarian in its focus on young
groups of undocumented immigrants. The language used in Secretary Napolitano’s
memorandum along with President Obama’s announcement exudes humanitarian
considerations. See generally Napolitano Memo, supra note 5, at 2; June 15, 2012 News
Release, supra note 58.
109 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival Statistics, Data on Individual
Applications and Petitions, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Sept. 15, 2013,
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/I
mmigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/daca-13-9-11.pdf.
110 Roberto G. Gonzalez & Veronica Terriquez, How DACA is Impacting the
Lives of Those Who Are Now DACAmented: Preliminary Findings from the National
UnDACAmented Research Project, Figure 1, Aug. 2013, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/docs/daca_final_ipc_csii_1.pdf.
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suggests that DACA recipients seek to be further integrated into
U.S. society.”111 Beyond humanitarian inclinations, DACA is
more effective than TPS because it implicitly values the benefits
to American society that DACA beneficiaries contribute. It also
provides a temporary solution in order to push forward
legislation that provides a more permanent fix.
III.

COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM TODAY

In light of changing immigration policies, on June 27,
2013, the United States Senate passed S.744, the “Border
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act,”112 the most significant and moderate immigration legislation
to come before Congress in recent years.113 A bipartisan group of
eight senators from both Republican and Democratic parties,
known as the “Gang of Eight,” wrote the Bill to address the
issues in immigration that so clearly divide Congress.114
The Bill suggests both increased border security and
granting some form of relief to undocumented immigrants. It
slightly modifies the family- and employment-based categories
for immigrants in the Immigration and Nationality Act,115
creates a new category of merit-based immigrant visas,116 and
more controversially, grants a pathway to citizenship, albeit a
long one, to the 11 million undocumented immigrants living in
the United States today.117 In the statement of congressional
findings, the Senators describe the underlying intent of the
Bill: “As a Nation, we have the right and responsibility to make
Id. at 2.
United States Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, Vote
Summary, SENATE.GOV (June 27, 2013), available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1&vote=00168.
113 Ashley Parker & Jonathan Martin, Senate, 68 to 32, Passes Overhaul for
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/
immigration-bill-clears-final-hurdle-to-senate-approval.html?smid=pl-share.
114 See generally Rachel Weiner, Immigration’s Gang of 8: Who are they?,
WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2013/01/28/immigrations-gang-of-8-who-are-they/; see generally also Parker &
Martin, supra note 113.
115 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. §§ 2305-23 & 4102-05 (2013).
116 Id. §§ 2301-02 (under “Subtitle C – Future Immigration”).
117 Id. §§ 2101-02 (where Chapter 5 of title II of 8 U.S.C. § 1255 et seq. is
amended by inserting Section 245B regarding “Adjustment of Status of Eligible
Entrants before December 31, 2011, to that of Registered Provisional Immigrant” and
where Chapter 5 of title II of 8 U.S.C. § 1255 is amended by inserting section 245C
regarding “Adjustment of Status of Registered Provisional Immigrants”); Immigration
Reform, Finally, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/
opinion/immigration-reform-finally.html.
111
112
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our borders safe, to establish clear and just rules for seeking
citizenship, to control the flow of legal immigration, and to
eliminate illegal immigration, which in some cases has become
a threat to our national security.”118
Title I of the Bill addresses border security enhancements,
which serve as “triggers” for other reforms before they are
implemented.119 These enhancements include the Comprehensive
Southern Border Security Commissions and Southern Border
Fencing Strategy, which are executed by creating an additional
independent fund to implement the Act.120 The border security
strategies act as a trigger to several provisions, including the
Registered Provisional Immigrant Program (RPI), which would
allow eligible undocumented immigrants to apply if they have
been in the United States since December 31, 2011, have no
significant criminal record, pay taxes, pass background checks,
and pay the application and penalty fee.121 RPI status would
permit work authorization and protection from deportation for
six years.122 Despite this, RPI status does not grant eligibility for
federal public benefits.123 Eventually, an RPI may adjust status
to that of a legal permanent resident after he or she gets to the
“Back of the Line”:
The status of a registered provisional immigrant may not be
adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence under this section until after the Secretary of State
certifies that immigrant visas have become available for all approved
petitions for immigrant visas that were filed under sections 201 and
203 before the date of the enactment of the Border Security,
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act.124

In addition to RPI status, the Bill also provides for other
forms of legalization including a Merits-Based Point System
which allows foreigners to obtain lawful permanent residence
in the United States based on points relating to their skills,
employment history, and education.125
The White House released a statement by President
Obama following the Senate’s passage of the bill: “The
bipartisan bill that passed today was a compromise. By
118 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2.
119 Id. § 3.
120 Id. §§ 4-5.
121 Id. § 2101(b).
122 Id. § 2101(d)(1).
123 Id. § 2101(d)(3).
124 Id. § 2102(c)(2).
125 Id. § 2301.
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definition, nobody got everything they wanted . . . . Today, the
Senate did its job. It’s now up to the House to do the same.”126
S.744 currently finds itself mired in congressional stalemate,
where the Republican majority in the House of Representatives
refuses to address the bill.127 As of September 2013, the House
has yet to consider the Senate bill, leaving millions of
undocumented immigrants waiting for reform.128
IV.

THE VARIOUS BENEFITS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

Given Congress’ inability to effectuate immigration
reform, prosecutorial discretion could be a mechanism to
educate and inform our leaders of the benefits of retaining
certain groups of undocumented immigrants. The benefits of
immigration have been consistently recognized in the immigration
reform debate. According to the CATO Institute’s Policy
Recommendations for the 108th Congress, “Immigration gives
America an economic edge in the global economy . . . . Immigrants
are not a drain on government finances . . . . [T]he typical
immigrant and his or her offspring will pay a net $80,000 more in
taxes during their lifetimes than they collect in government
services.”129 Similarly, the Center for Immigration Studies has
recognized the correlation between increased education in
immigrant populations, higher paying jobs, and increased tax
revenue, which all serve as benefits to American society.130
In advocating for the passage of the DREAM Act,
supporters cited to the Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe,
where the Court held that undocumented immigrant youths
are entitled to free public school education from kindergarten
through high school.131 The reasoning behind this decision was
126 News Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement
by President Obama on Senate Passage of Immigration Reform (June 27, 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/27/statement-presidentobama-senate-passage-immigration-reform-0.
127 Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, Republicans in House Resist
Overhaul for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/11/us/politics/gop-in-house-resists-overhaul-for-immigration.html?smid=pl-share.
128 Michael D. Shear & Julia Preston, Immigration Reform Falls to the Back of
the Line, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/us/politics/
immigration-reform-falls-to-the-back-of-the-line.html?smid=pl-share.
129 Cato Institute, The Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations
for the 108th Congress, (Sept. 1, 2003), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2003/9/hb108-63.pdf.
130 Steven A. Camarota, The High Cost of Cheap Labor: Illegal Immigration and
the Federal Budget, CTR. IMMIGR. STUDS., 23 (2004), available at http://www.cis.org/
sites/cis.org/files/articles/2004/fiscal.pdf.
131 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
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that undocumented children had committed no crime, and should
not be punished for the crimes of their parents.132 Further, the
Court emphasized the need to educate undocumented immigrant
children because, “by denying these children a basic education, we
deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic
institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will
contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our
Nation.”133 The children of undocumented immigrants will
continue to be part of American society. Today’s immigration
system should encourage the American government to take the
steps necessary for the U.S. to legally accept them.134
Policy statements from top-ranking immigration
officials prior to Obama’s DACA program conveyed a similar
philosophy. As previously discussed, the Meissner memo on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion discretely weaves into the
classic economic concerns of the agency’s enforcement priorities
an emphasis on humanitarian concerns. In describing the
development of a list of “triggers” to help INS District Directors
identify suitable cases for the favorable exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, Meissner identifies factors such as “Aliens with
lengthy presence in United States (i.e., 10 years or more)” and
“Aliens present in the United States since childhood.”135 The
memo concludes that these trigger facts are meant to facilitate
“identification of potential cases that may be suitable for
prosecutorial review as early as possible in the process.”136
Through the early targeting of individuals that should receive a
favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the agency
spends its resources on the crucial enforcement priorities of
criminal aliens while reaffirming that the deportation of
certain individuals should be reassessed.
Similarly, an October 2005 memorandum by Principal
Legal Advisor to ICE, William J. Howard, regarding the necessity
of prosecutorial discretion for the agency’s enforcement priorities,
combined the concern of prioritizing enforcement with the
humanitarian necessity for prosecutorial discretion.137 After
Id.
Id. at 223.
134 See Annand supra note 10, at 709 (advocating for passage of DREAM act
given reality that DREAMers will continue to be part of American society).
135 Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 11.
136 Id.
137 Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on Prosecutorial Discretion, 4-6 (Oct. 24, 2005),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092975/ICE-Guidance-Memo-ProsecutorialDiscretion-William-J-Howard-10-24-05.
132
133
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detailing the various instances and manners of exercising
prosecutorial discretion throughout the lifetime of an immigration
case, a discussion that is peppered with considerable
humanitarian factors,138 Howard concluded the memorandum by
stressing that prosecutorial discretion was a “very significant tool”
that should be used in “cases involving human suffering and
hardship.”139 He added: “our reasoned determination in making
prosecutorial discretion decisions can be a significant benefit to
the efficiency and fairness of the removal process.”140 Likewise, in
a November 2007 memorandum discussing prosecutorial
discretion, written by Assistant Secretary of ICE Julie Myers,
compassion and family unity were stressed as important factors
in considering whether to take nursing mothers into custody.141
Attached to the Myers memo was the original memorandum on
prosecutorial discretion of INS Commissioner Doris Meissner.
Finally, the memoranda published by Director of ICE
John Morton in 2011 also joined the economic goals of the
agency’s enforcement priorities with significant humanitarian
factors to determine the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
First, the memorandum of March 2011 set out enforcement
priorities by creating specific and distinguishable categories:
aliens who pose a threat to national security (priority 1); aliens
who recently reentered the United States illegally (priority 2);
and aliens who are fugitives (priority 3).142
Given the explicit categories created for enforcement
priorities, and the rise in criminal aliens, Morton emphasized
that prosecutorial discretion should be soundly exercised, and
that “particular care should be given when dealing with lawful
permanent residents, juveniles, and the immediate family
members of U.S. citizens.”143 Morton’s June 2011 memorandum
reemphasized these priorities, building on previous agency
memoranda,144 and specifically delineating factors to be
considered when issuing a favorable exercise of prosecutorial
discretion—factors with an emphasis on humanitarian interests
and an implicit acknowledgement of the positive impact of certain
individuals on American society.145 These factors include the
alien’s length of time in the United States, circumstances of his
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Myers Memo, supra note 68, at 1.
Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50, at 1-2.
Id. at 4.
Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 50, at 1.
Id. at 4.
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or her arrival (particularly if he or she arrived as a young child)
and the person’s pursuit of education in the United States.146
Recognizing the benefits derived from the retention of
certain immigrants who have the potential to positively impact
American society has resonated throughout the recent political
discourse on immigration reform—sometimes even on both
sides of the political spectrum. For instance, at the 2012
Republican National Convention, former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice expressed this same ideology: “We must
continue to welcome the world’s most ambitious people to be a
part of us. In that way, we stay young and optimistic and
determined. We need immigration laws that protect our borders,
meet our economic needs, and yet show that we are a
compassionate nation of immigrants.”147 Similarly, the New
York Times quoted Republican Senator from Florida Marco
Rubio saying that legislation for immigration reform “should
also recognize that legal immigration has been a boon to the
United States in the past and is ‘critical to our future.’”148 Some
Democratic leaders have even been arrested in the name of
immigration reform.149
It is clear from the evolution of the above-cited policy
memoranda that consideration of the favorable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion both addresses the economic necessity
of enforcement priorities (given the limited resources of the
agencies), and balances humanitarian concerns for fair and
compassionate immigration laws. At the same time, use of
prosecutorial discretion also provides an opportunity to
individually identify and provide relief to those immigrants who
contribute positively to the economic and cultural fabric of
American society. Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum regarding
the use of prosecutorial discretion as a relief tool for certain
young immigrants is an extension of the aforementioned policy
which has been utilized by the DHS since the Meissner memo.

Id.
Condoleezza Rice, Former Secretary of State, Address to Republican
National Convention (Aug. 29, 2012), transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2012/08/29/transcript-condoleezza-rice-speech-at-rnc/#ixzz2HmLITSNl.
148 Julia Preston, Rubio Pushes His Party on Immigration Changes, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/us/politics/marco-rubio-pushesrepublican-party-on-immigration-changes.html?hp&_r=0.
149 Julia Preston, 8 Lawmakers Arrested at Immigration Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/8-lawmakers-arrested-at-immigrationprotest.html.
146
147
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CONCLUSION
Despite the best efforts of certain members of Congress
to find common ground and pass comprehensive immigration
reform, little progress has been made. Eleven million
undocumented immigrants continue to live in the shadows,
contributing to the growth of the American economy yet are
consistently marginalized and ignored. It is through the
mechanism of prosecutorial discretion that comprehensive,
efficient, and humanitarian immigration reform can be
effectuated. Given the adjudicative nature of the mechanism, the
DACA program would have the potential to affect many eligible
noncitizens. This may explain why the agency initially failed to
offer proper guidelines for the use of deferred action.150 The
Morton memos clearly evince a greater care in the transparent
use of prosecutorial discretion under the Obama administration.
Although these agency statements have addressed some of the
problems that were prevalent with deferred action, the intense
opposition to comprehensive immigration reform is worrisome.
Over the years, although acknowledging the need for
serious reform, Congress has been unable to agree on granting
relief to hardworking, though undocumented, members of
American society. Yet, the economic and cultural benefits of
these productive members of American society have been
unequivocally demonstrated.151 Prosecutorial discretion calls for
fair humanitarian policies in addition to the need for economic
and administrative efficiency. And, given congressional gridlock
in immigration reform, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, of
which DACA is an exemplary illustration, has been and can be
effectively used as a temporary measure to relieve certain
undocumented immigrants from the unfair immigration policies
of our time.
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